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1 Introduction  
At its inception in the policy domain Flexicurity has been defined as an integrated policy 
strategy – at various levels – with the aim to enhance, at the same time and in a 
deliberate way, flexibility and security in the labour market. It thus attempts to reconcile 
employers' need for a flexible workforce with workers' need for security – confidence 
that they will not face long periods of unemployment and income loss (Wilthagen & Tros, 
2004; European Commission, 2007).  
Moreover, the concept of flexicurity can be understood as a “state of affairs”, where 
‘state’ is not a static but a dynamic concept referring to stocks (of labour and various 
forms of capital) as well as to flows and outcomes, the so-called SFO approach. This 
approach fundamentally rests on an ‘agency-structure’ perspective where agency refers 
to the behaviour of individual/collective actors like employees and employers on the 
labour market and structure to labour market institutions, regulations, laws and 
practices affecting individual/collective actors’ behaviour but at the same time also being 
affected by the way actors behave (see also Leschke & Watt, 2010). The approach 
serves as a useful analytical framework and for monitoring the progress in the 
performance of countries on the flexicurity-security nexus (i.e. the state of affairs) – it 
is portrayed in Figure 1 below. 
In the agency part of the model (in Figure 1 the upper part) the stocks reflect the various 
forms of human, cultural (e.g. trust) and social capital or capabilities which have been 
build up in the past through investments in education and skill formation, work 
experience, participation in social activities and social networks, and the flows the 
transitions and duration in these states (e.g. % of people moving in and out of 
employment or unemployment and the duration of stay in these states). The outcomes 
with respect to flexicurity are the attained level of the various types of flexibility and the 
various types of security (see below in this paper). The structure part (the lower part in 
Figure 1) concerns flexicurity policies and institutions at the EU, national and 
decentral level, impacting actors’ behaviour and mediating the flexibility and security 
outcomes, i.e. the state of affairs. Flexicurity policies constitute of four components 
as will be explained below: Life Long-Learning (LLL); Flexible Contractual Agreements 
(FCA); Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) and Modernised Social Security Systems 
(MSS). 
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Figure 1: Flexicurity as a ‘States of Affairs’: A Stock-Flow-Outcome (SFO) 
Approach 
FCA=Flexible and Reliable Contractual Agreements; ALMP=Efficient Active Labour 
Market Policies; LLL=Responsive Life-long Learning systems MSS=Modernised Social 
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2 Background 
The flexicurity concept was coined in the second half of the 1990s, notably in the 
Netherlands and Denmark and further developed by academics and policy-makers. In 
the early 2000s the concept gained interest at the European level and the European 
Commission started to actively explore, investigate and elaborate the concept. The need 
to balance flexibility and security was included in the early European Employment 
Guidelines. In 2007 the Council accepted eight Common Principles on Flexicurity1 
and flexicurity became a key policy within the EU’s employment strategy. These 
Common Principles recommend: 
 Broadening the introduction of the Lisbon Strategy to improve employment and 
social cohesion within the EU. 
 Striking a balance between the rights and responsibilities of employers, 
employees, persons seeking employment and public authorities. 
 Adapting the principle of flexicurity to the circumstances of each Member 
State 
 Supporting and protecting employees when they are not in work or during a 
period of transition, to integrate them into the labour market or to coach them 
towards stable work contracts. 
 Developing flexicurity within the enterprise as well as external flexicurity 
between enterprises, in order to support career development. 
 Promoting gender equality and equal opportunities for all. 
 Encouraging co-operation between the social partners, the authorities and other 
stakeholders. 
 A fair distribution of the budgetary costs and the benefits of flexicurity 
policies, especially between businesses, individuals and public budgets, with 
particular attention to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Flexicurity represents an important element of the Employment Guidelines and 
the European Employment Strategy as a whole. Integrated flexicurity policies play a key 
role in modernising labour markets and contributing to the achievement of the 75% 
employment rate target set by the Europe 2020 Strategy. Measures taken or initiated 
in this context that refer to flexicurity include: 
1. The Agenda for new skills and jobs for upgrading, anticipating and better 
matching of skills and jobs, equipping people with the right skills for employment; 
improving job quality and the working conditions; and supporting job creation.2 
2. Youth on the Move: to help young people acquire skills, qualifications and 
experience through a comprehensive package of policy initiatives on education 
and employment for young people in Europe.3 
3. Anticipating, preparing and managing company restructuring by reducing the 
negative impact of restructuring and help people capitalise on the opportunities 
it presents.4 
4. Strengthening public employment services such as job search support, 
career analyses, validation of experience, etc. and promoting the modernisation 
                                           
1 COM(2007) 359 final 
2 COM(2008) 868 final. 
3 COM(2010) 477 final. 
4 COM(2010) 882 final. 
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and strenghtening of PES service delivery5, including the Youth Guarantee that 
was agreed among Member States in April 2013.6 
5. The so-called Euro Plus Pact.7 
Consensus has been reached with national governments, social partners and academics 
in the EU that flexicurity policies can be developed and implemented by Member States 
along four components (COM): 
1. Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements (FCA): to support ‘outsiders’ 
who are employed on short-term or irregular contracts or are unemployed to find 
work and to move into more stable contractual arrangements and sustainable 
careers – and to support ‘insiders’, employed on open-ended contracts, prepare 
themselves for job changes and new labour market demands. 
2. Responsive and comprehensive lifelong learning strategies (LLL): to 
ensure that EU citizens have the opportunity to obtain a high quality initial 
education, develop a broad range of key skills and acquire new skills and to be 
able to upgrade existing skills throughout their working lives. 
3. Effective active labour market policies (ALMP): to help unemployed people 
back to work through job placement services and labour market programmes, 
such as job search guidance and intensive courses. 
4. Modern social security systems (MSS): EU governments need to provide 
adequate unemployment benefits to act as a safety net when people are changing 
jobs and offer healthcare benefits in case they fall ill as well as pensions for when 
they retire. 
The European Commission encourages Member States to work with social partners with 
a view to including approaches to flexicurity policies in their National Reform 
Programmes, viewing social dialogue as a key condition in designing a flexicurity labour 
market based on the aforementioned components (European Commission, 2007). 
The European Commission (2007) characterizes the OECD definition of flexicurity 
policies broadly as follows: moderate Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), high 
participation in lifelong learning, high spending on labour market policies (both passive 
and active), generous unemployment benefit systems balancing rights and duties, broad 
coverage of social security systems, and high trade union coverage (see also OECD, 
2006; Eriksson, 2012). Active involvement of social partners is essential to ensure that 
flexicurity delivers to all. Integrated flexicurity policies are often found in countries were 
the dialogue (and trust relations) between social partners, and between social partners 
and public authorities, has played an important role. Flexicurity can also be said to 
bridge the opposite poles of the broad spectrum of social models, combining the best of 
the unregulated, liberal model and the regulated, classical social model (see for an 
extended explanation of these models (Muffels, Crouch & Wilthagen, 2014). 
The so-called Wilthagen or flexicurity matrix further specifies the dimensions of 
flexibility and security by distinguishing four forms within each dimension: external-
numerical (hiring and firing), internal-numerical (working-time), functional (or 
employability) and wage flexibility, and job, employment, income (or social) and 
combination (work-life balance) security. These forms of flexibility and security can be 
complementary and mutually supportive, leading to various productive flexibility-
security combinations or modalities (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004; Tros, 2012). Both the 
typology of components of flexicurity and the flexicurity matrix have been extensively 
used in flexicurity research and debate over the past decade. 
                                           
5 VC(2007) 0927 final report. 
6 2013/C 120/01 
7 COM(2010) 682/3. 
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At this point in time, seven years after the launch of the Common Principles of 
Flexicurity, the following questions might be considered relevant in the debate on the 
perspectives for flexicuriy policies: 
1. Which typical flexicurity approaches can be observed among the EU Member 
States in view of general challenges? 
2. Which flexicurity strategies are envisaged as a response to these challenges? 
3. How has the financial crisis affected the state of flexicurity in the European Union 
(see also Auer & Chatani, 2011)? And what kind of flexicurity policies and 
practices have countries developed in coping with the crisis, also with a view on 
the possibilities and opportunities of mutual learning? 
4. What is the future outlook of flexicurity in the recovery after the crisis – is there 
a need for a flexicurity 2.0 strategy? 
The remaining part of this paper will deal with these questions, taking into account the 
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3 Approaches to flexicurity 
3.1 General challenges for countries  
Much of what has been written in the flexicurity literature and research departed from 
Esping-Andersen’s seminal typology of welfare states (1990) followed by many other 
authors (e.g. Ferrera, 1996). This research largely confirmed the existence of flexicurity 
clusters among the EU Member States, using the two dimensions of high-low labour 
market flexibility and high-low labour market security where the average at EU level 
acts as the reference level. In EU policy-making a typology has been applied not being 
based on a predefined set of statistical features but on the existence of geographical 
clusters: a Nordic cluster (usually including the Netherlands), a Western or 
Anglophone cluster (UK and Ireland), a Southern cluster (Mediterranean countries), a 
Central-Continental cluster (Belgium, Germany, Austria) and a Central-Eastern 
European cluster. However, both the theoretical and policy-geographically oriented 
typologies of flexicurity are not perfect in the sense that they do not fully mirror the 
empirical ‘states’ of flexicurity in the various countries. The heterogeneity within the 
respective clusters tends to be significant, e.g. in the Central-East European cluster but 
also within the Continental and Nordic cluster. Some countries compare better with 
countries in other clusters than in their own. Last but not least, the states of flexicurity 
are not “frozen”, especially not in times of crisis. Therefore, these typologies should be 
considered and used at best as paradigmatic or “ideal typical” types. In practice there 
are mostly hybrid forms combining features from various social models (see Goodin & 
Rein, 2001).   
The following four ideal-typical flexicurity pathways depart from typical challenges 
country clusters are confronted with (Bekker & Wilthagen, 2008; Muffels & Wilthagen, 
2013;):  
 Dealing with flexibility at the margin of the labour market. It suggests reducing 
asymmetries between standard and non-standard work by promoting upward 
transitions in the labour market (e.g. from temporary into open-end contracts) 
and by integrating non-standard contracts fully into labour law, collective 
agreements, social security, and lifelong learning systems; 
 Securing timely transitions from job-to-job and from not-work into work to 
strengthen mobility; 
 Providing access to learning and good transitions for all by strengthening 
investments in skills; 
 Comprehensive social security supporting transitions to regular work, increasing 
the employment and job opportunities of persons who are currently on social 




Mutual Learning Programme Thematic Paper 
 
November ,   2014 7 
 
4 Flexicurity during the crisis 
4.1 The state of flexicurity in the EU during the crisis 
In the years the European flexicurity concept was developed the EU’s economy and 
labour market was doing rather well: employment and labour market participation levels 
went up and unemployment rates went down (Bekker, 2012). In this period there was 
a rather supportive political climate to work on a more social Europe (Tros, 2012). The 
recent financial and economic crisis that became manifest in the autumn of 2008, less 
than a year after the Common Principles of Flexicurity were accepted, has dramatically 
altered this context and highlighted the need for changes in the operation of markets, 
including the labour market (Auer, 2010b). The economic recession is thought to have 
put pressure on the implementation of flexicurity in the EU Member States and, on the 
other hand, evoked questions on the underlying features of the concept itself (Tros, 
2012). The main concern was that flexicurity policies could not prevent the steep rise 
of (youth) unemployment as a consequence of the dramatic drop in output at the wake 
of the crisis.8 However, part of the test must include the employment recovery 
performance through safeguarding access to steady employment for the insiders and 
outsiders. 
The state of affairs and key policy patterns of flexicurity in the EU country clusters will 
be briefly and very generally summarized below per cluster (using quantitative data up 
to 2011, and qualitative data), also addressing current challenges. 
NORTH: 
The Northern Member States still show relatively high scores on all four components, 
especially ALMP and LLL. The levels of both flexibility and security are still highest 
compared to other country clusters. 
 Adjustment has taken place through quick separations (Denmark), reduction of 
working hours (most), transition security and generous social security systems 
(Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and through reducing temporary staff initially 
while retaining high shares of flexible labour (the Netherlands). 
 Continuing challenges: the financing of ALMP, MSS, and LLL; reduced security 
levels might reduce the support for flexibility, while putting an extra burden on 
e.g. the income position of weak groups. 
MIDDLE: 
Continental Member States are featured by intermediate-to-upper level scores on ALMP, 
MSS and LLL with varying performance in the use of flexible and reliable contracts. 
 Levels of internal flexibility are higher than those of external flexibility, mobility 
is relatively low, combined with intermediate-to-upper level scores on ALMP, MSS 
and LLL; 
 Adjustment mainly through reduction of working hours/internal flexicurity 
(formal schemes, Germany, Austria), temporary unemployment scheme 
(Belgium), employment pools (Austria); 
 Continuing challenges: increase mobility, warrant financial sustainability, 
producitvity and effectiveness of ALMP, MSS and LLL. 
WEST: 
The Anglo-Saxon Member states display varying performances with the UK scoring 
intermediate-to-upper level with regard to flexible and reliable contracts and Ireland 
scoring low in this dimension. These positions are reversed in the areas of MSS and 
ALMP. 
                                           
8 On the transitions of youth in the labour market and flexicurity see Madsen et al., 2013. 
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 Levels of flexibility remain higher than those of security, though investments in 
LLL are relatively high. 
 Adjustment through quick separations, reduction of working hours (but 
informally, without formal schemes), wage flexibility, returning home of 
migrants. 
 Continuing challenges: prevention of long-term unemployment, poverty risks, 
access to LLL. 
SOUTH: 
The Southern Member States show divergent performances. Regarding flexible and 
reliable contracts some countries are close to the bottom end of the spectrum, whereas 
other countries share a high level of involuntary fixed-term contracts with low levels of 
security. Performance on MSS is intermediate-to-upper level and the scores on ALMP 
and LLL are intermediate-to-lower. Levels of flexibility with a view to using fixed-term 
labour remain higher than of maintaining high levels of security and there is limited 
scope for intensifying ALMP and LLL spending. 
 Adjustment follows mainly through the flexible segment of the labour market; 
the stepping stone to open ended contracts is not solid; that means that the 
transition rate into regular contracts is low; 
 Continuing challenges: job creation, long-term unemployment, lost generation, 
overcoming two-tier or dual labour market issues (unequal access). 
EAST: 
As indicated already these (rather new) Member States show a lot of variety and might 
be less seen as a coherent cluster. 
 They have lower positions in all dimensions, with Slovenia and Poland being 
exceptions in terms of flexible and reliable contracts (FRC), Cyprus in MSS and 
Czech Republic and Malta in LLL. 
 Adjustment has mainly been managed through redundancies and short-time 
working (with limited income support) and reduced nominal and real wages; 
 Continuing challenges: prevention of long-term unemployment, increased scope 
for MSS, ALMP and LLL spending; building of institutional capacity is needed 
(social dialogue). 
4.2 Flexicurity practices during the economic crisis 
This section describes a brief selection of flexicurity policies and practices in the 
European Union, developed or already in use as a response to the economic crisis, and 
fitting the definition provided in section 1 of this paper. 
Internal numerical flexibility combined with social security: short-time 
working arrangements and working-time accounts 
Various countries introduced new – sometimes temporary – short-time working 
arrangements (STWA) or expanded the scope of existing short-time work 
arrangements in order to prevent losses in human capital or bankruptcy caused by the 
economic downturn. The majority of countries financially supported training activities 
(Austria, Belgium, France and Germany) or made participation in training mandatory 
during the STWA (Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Slovenia) – these measures 
did however not always guarantee that training was indeed taken up (Waltz et al., 
2012). 
The newly established STWA are less generous and more stringent in terms of eligibility 
and conditionality requirements compared to STWA that had been established before 
the wake of the financial crisis in 2008-09. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
generosity, eligibility and conditional requirements of STWA during the 2008-09 crisis 
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maximized the effect and impact of STWA. The involvement of social partners in some 
countries led to (additional) agreements about STWA. These agreements often 
increased the generosity of the employee schemes. Furthermore, it appears that within 
the EU countries only in old member states STWA is financed by the unemployment 
benefit system. New member states finance STWA from the state budget or from the 
European Social Fund (Waltz et al., 2012). 
Germany is a good example of the company practices that aim at synchronizing 
business cycles with working hours. Working times accounts (and complementary 
short-time work allowances) (Kurzarbeit) have played an important role in supporting 
labour hoarding in the economic downturn (f.e. Eichhorst et al., 2010). Working time 
accounts in Germany facilitate flexibility in the number of hours (i.e. internal-numerical 
flexibility) by day, by week or over the year and are extensively regulated in collective 
agreements and company arrangements in German workplaces. In 2009: 30% of 
German companies made use of working time accounts (reduction of hours or working 
time credits). In some months in 2009: 1.4 million persons in Germany were in short-
time work. In Germany and Italy between 2.5 and 5% of the workforce participated in 
short-time work arrangements in the high recession period. In the UK no formal 
schemes exist, but a reduction of working hours is accepted at the company level by 
workers on a voluntary basis (e.g. by taking up leave or holidays). 
Functional and external-numerical flexibility combined with employment 
security: job transition systems 
The UK introduced The Young Person’s Guarantee (transition security for young people) 
in 2009, a suite of programmes for job seekers aged from 18 to 24. Claimants are 
referred to the YPG programme of their choice somewhere around the tenth month of 
their Job Seekers Allowance claim.There are four YPG options: sectoral routeways: pre-
employment courses to place young people into targeted industry sectors, such as care 
work, the Future Jobs Fund: government-funded 'jobs' of 6 months duration, paying 
rate-for-the-job (in practice likely to be minimum wage), Work-focused training: 
enabling claimants to take existing, vocational training courses at colleges, learning 
providers etc. and Community Task Force: work placements of up to 6 months duration, 
that do not pay rate-for-the-job. 
In the Netherlands a “Work Experience Grant” scheme for young job seekers was 
started at the municipality level, in the city of Tilburg, initiated by Tilburg University and 
two Dutch trade unions for young workers. School-leavers that cannot find a job are 
stimulated and facilitated to find a traineeship at a company or institution that matches 
both the level and relevant content of their education. The youngster is encouraged to 
actively approach a company or institution. Alternatively the employer can post a Work 
Experience Grant vacancy on the special website that was established for that purpose: 
www.startersbeurs.nu The employer pays at least 100 euro per month to the young 
person and the municipality pays in 400 euro (using ESF funding), so that a total grant 
of 500 euro per month is created, given for a maximum period of 6 months that cannot 
be prolonged. At the start of the work experience period, the youngster completes a 
competence test, via the registration website to assess his or her general competences. 
This test is repeated at end of the work experience period in order to document which 
specific competences have been strengthened due to the traineeship. Currently more 
than 150 Dutch municipalities have joined the scheme and research shows that 52 
percent of the job seekers have found a job one month after completion of the work 
experience period. 
In Sweden collective funds are used for job-to-job transitions. The social partners 
established bi-partite ‘employment security councils’ or transition agencies at the sector 
level, financed by employers’ fees based on 0.3% of the labour costs. The system 
operates as a form of insurance system, distributing the risk and costs of economic 
dismissals among the companies in the branches. The councils provide consultation in 
early stages of restructuring, outplacement services for redundant workers and finance 
temporarily salary-gaps in case of outplacement to lower paid jobs. Sometimes these 
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councils employ job coaches, sometimes these services are outsourced to private 
providers (Borghouts, 2012: Tros 2012). Finland shows similar developments: ‘change 
security funds’ and tripartite ‘Flexicurity Committees’ at the sector level.  
Belgium stepped up measures to secure outplacement support for dismissed workers. 
In 2009 the Economic Recovery Law outplacement rights and obligations for redundant 
workers were strengthened and all private employers in restructuring are obliged to 
install ‘re-employment cells’ to promote fast replacement of their dismissed workers to 
another paid job. This outplacement policy, which includes legal entitlements for 
workers, was further broadened in 2014. The Belgian case is an example of a structural 
and encompassing policy of enforcing ‘activating restructuring’. In the 2014 reforms 
Belgium also decided on a uniform labour statute (Eenheidsstatuut) for white and blue 
collar workers, ending the traditional dual system that existed for these two groups, 
notably in the area of dismissal protection and procedures. At the same time several 
other adjustments were made, such as the obligation to use part of the severance pay 
budget as an active component to prepare for the transition to another job (Wilthagen, 
2014). Spain and Slovenia engaged in a reform of EPL of open ended and temporary 
contracts during the crisis, Spain also taking into account the importance of enhancing 
internal flexibility for that matter. These flexicurity reforms not only resulted in reduced 
labour market segmentation but also contributed to renewed economic growth with 
employment creation. 
 
4.3 Unemployment rates and flexicurity  
Over the past years the unemployment rate has been used as one of the indicators of 
the flexicurity state or performance of countries. Although it is certainly interesting to 
measure and compare the development of unemployment in the so-called flexicurity 
countries, unemployment is clearly not solely determined - let alone resolved - by 
flexicurity policies. Very often the discussion about the ‘best’ social or economic model 
starts from a certain favorable state of affairs in a “model country”, usually low 
unemployment, and it is then assumed that this state can be fully attributed to the 
chosen particular policy mix in that country, while further arguing that other countries 
that manage to copy or imitate this policy mix will gain naturally from a similar favorable 
state of affairs. This argumentation certainly is tempting, but just as questionable, as 
unemployment has manifold macroeconomic causes.  Nevertheless, the dynamics and 
characteristics of unemployment can to a certain extent be explained by certain features 
of a country’s flexibility-security mix. 
Let’s look at the development in a few countries, belonging to the various EU’s 
geographical clusters (Figure 2 below). Between 2007 and 2013, Denmark, the 
Netherlands – both countries labelled flexicurity countries in the past years - Germany, 
Spain, Poland and United Kingdom experienced different trends in total unemployment 
rates. In all six countries unemployment increased, with an extremely sharp increase in 
Spain that already started before 2008. The Netherlands and Denmark initially 
experienced the lowest unemployment rates with Denmark showing a relatively sharp 
rise and being surpassed by Germany around 2010. The Netherlands showed a further 
rise around 2012 and was then also surpassed by Germany, showing a steady declining 
unemployment that already started around 2009 – in 2008 Germany was still the second 
worst performer regarding the level of unemployment after Spain within this selection 
of countries. Poland more or less followed the EU average in the rising trend of 
unemployment, reaching a level just above the 10 percent threshold. In the UK 
unemployment grew but the trend started to flatten after 2010-2011. In 2013 all 
countries except Spain and Poland fall within the range of 5 to10 percent 
unemployment, with Germany having the lowest rates at a stable level, unemployment 
further decreasing in Denmark and the UK while still growing in the Netherlands at that 
time. 
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Figure 2: Unemployment rate 2007-2013 (%) (Source: Eurostat) 
 
What does this tell us about flexicurity? Heyes (2011) states that the development in 
Spain, which has seen an extremely large drop in its employment level notwithstanding 
a high employment protection legislation index, can be explained by Spain’s 
exceptionally large share of workers on contracts of limited duration. He also contends 
that the European Commission regards the use of these contracts as facilitating the 
contractual flexibility needed to deliver ‘flexicurity’. However, the Netherlands also has 
a relatively high EPL index score for permanent workers and a high share of temporary 
work of 30% in 2014 at similar levels recorded in Spain, Portugal and also Poland. Yet, 
the Netherlands did not experience a similar strongly increasing unemployment trend 
as Spain which is due to firms maintaining initially high levels of regular employment 
through ‘labour hoarding’. 
Auer (2010a) mentions as the main question whether flexicurity countries, with labour 
market institutions and adaptation mechanisms and actors’ behaviour relying on lay-
offs, generous social protection and active labour market policies for the reintegration 
of the unemployed, will survive the adversity caused by the shock of the crisis better 
than counties that have relied more on stringent employment protection, combined with 
internal adjustment measures, such as Germany. Using data covering the period up to 
2009 he concludes that the recent economic downturn has not (yet) confirmed that 
flexicurity is a superior way of organizing labour markets as it might have appeared 
before the crisis. Indeed, at least some of the countries that are associated with 
flexicurity have experienced worse unemployment increases than other non-flexicurity 
countries during the crisis, although their levels of unemployment are still relatively low. 
Auer (2010b) states: “Relying too heavily on external adjustment (even when protected 
by generous unemployment benefits) may lead to a vicious circle of quickly rising 
unemployment and ensuing long-term unemployment in the case that employability 
levels are low. As long as the social protection systems are sustained, such flexicurity 
arrangements may survive, but will be put under strain also by the fiscal constraints 
governments confront. In the recent economic crisis, countries that have used internal 
adjustment mechanisms under stricter regulation of employment security seem to have 
fared better than countries following the route of marginal or external flexibilisation. 
This can show that ‘stricter employment protection cum protected internal adjustment’ 
can be an attractive alternative to ‘reducing employment protection cum protected 
external adjustment’”. However, not all countries that have adopted this first adaptation 
route of internal flexibilisation are among the best performers when it comes to 
unemployment, including Belgium and France. Again, the issue appears more complex 
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evolution of unemployment such as the debt position of households, the level of 
consumption and capital investment, the employment structure, the advancement of 
product technology in manufacturing (product innovation) or the competitive strength 
of the export sector (Caspar et al., 2012). Eichhorst et al. (2010) e.g. argue that 
Denmark and Germany more quickly recovered from the output shock caused by the 
crisis because of the generosity of their benefit systems stabilizing the level of 
consumption. At the same time Eichhorst et al. (2010) conclude that it  is not surprising 
that many countries expanded or introduced short-time work schemes in order to 
sustain employment during the recent crisis not just the continental countries. Short-
time work arrangements allow for a smooth short-term adjustment, but also mean “a 
costly bet on a quick recovery” while adversely affecting productivity levels. 
Furthermore, even in highly regulated labor markets with elaborate systems of internal 
flexibility, non-standard workers show a much stronger risk of being made redundant 
during a crisis. Hence, “the burden of adjustment in the current downturn is distributed 
rather unequally between insiders and outsiders and tends to reinforce the dualisation 
of the labour market”. 
4.4 Measuring flexibility and security in the EU throughout the crisis 
In order to measure flexicurity outcomes adequately we need to go beyond using 
institutional indicators only (such as the level of EPL regulation or ALMP expenditures) 
as is traditionally done and to construct dynamic outcome indicators on flexibility and 
security. These can then be used to compare the performance of countries before and 
during the crisis period. In this section two mobility and two transition security indicators 
are defined. The mobility indicators are the job-to-job mobility and the contract mobility 
indicator. The first one is calculated as the percentage of people moving annually from 
one job into another, weighted with the share of employed persons. The second is the 
weighted mobility rate for people moving from fixed-term to open-ended contracts and 
vice versa showing whether indeed temporary jobs acts as ‘stepping stones’ into steady 
jobs or not. The two mobility indicators are next combined into one index. The transition 
security indicators are a transition employment security index and a transition income 
security index. The first index is the weighted percentage of workers moving into a more 
secure employment status in the following year netted for the people moving into a less 
secure status and weighted with the share of workers in each status.9 Likewise, the 
income security index is the weighted percentage of people improving their income 
security, that is the likelihood of staying out of poverty for another year or escaping 
poverty, netted for the people reducing their income security, i.e. is the likelihood of 
staying poor or moving into poverty.10 The two indicators on job and entry-exit mobility 
were combined into a labour market mobility index (LMI) and the two indicators on 
security into an income and employment transition security index (TSI)11. Countries’ 
positions on these indicators indicate the extent by which the goals of flexibility 
(efficiency) and security (income, employment) are attained. The data used come from 
the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2006–2011, 
supplemented with data from the annual German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for 
1984–2011. The results are shown in Figure 3, in which the two thick lines represent 
the European averages on the two composite indices for 29 European countries. 
 
                                           
2We consider transitions out of employment into unemployment or inactivity as transitions into more insecurity 
and into employment as transitions into more security. People residing in non-employment for another period 
are considered more insecure and people residing in employment more secure 
10Poverty refers to the country-specific minimum income threshold the European Commission is using for its 
poverty indicators, being 60 percent of the equivalent household income in each country.  
11. EU-SILC contained no data on temporary jobs for Denmark for which reason the job mobility rate for 
Denmark is underestimated because it refers to open-end contracts only in which mobility is much lower than 
in temporary contracts.  
Mutual Learning Programme Thematic Paper 
 
November ,   2014 13 
 
Figure 3. Flexibility-security outcomes before and during the crisis (source: EU-SILC 
2006-2011) 
 
Before the crisis we find that mainly the Nordic countries Sweden, Norway and Finland 
combine high scores on labour mobility and transition income and employment security. 
Remarkably, this does not hold for Denmark but that might be an artefact of the data 
since we have no information on contract mobility in EU-SILC because of which the 
mobility figures for Denmark are underestimated. Another reason might be that the 
mobility figures for Denmark are indeed moderate due to more stringent employment 
protection regulations than the (pre 2013) OECD’s EPL figures for Denmark show (cf. 
Janssen, 2013; specifically on Denmark see Jørgensen, 2010).  Note also the position 
of the United Kingdom with high levels of mobility but moderate levels of transition 
security that is caused by low levels of notably transition income security. Further to 
his, figure 3 shows that Spain has a high mobility caused by a high level of job mobility 
in fixed-term contracts which last relatively short (<6 months). The low mobility in the 
Netherlands can be attributed to the low mobility in open ended contracts. Note also the 
low mobility figures in the main Continental countries such as Germany and especially 
France whereas they perform much better in terms of safeguarding transition security. 
The Southern countries Italy, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus belong to the quadrant with 
low levels of mobility and security whereas the situation of the Eastern countries is very 
heterogeneous. The latter countries share low levels of transition security but very 
different levels of mobility. All in all the crisis has had a strong impact on the levels of 
mobility and transition security. 
Viewing the effects of the crisis we find that in many countries the balance between 
flexibility and security has been distorted because of reduced levels of mobility but 
notably of transition security in nearly all countries. A part of this impact stems from 
the implementation of austerity measures (Heyes, 2013; Kattel & Raudla, 2013; 
Matsaganis, 2012).  The figures reflect the situation up to 2011 whereas in many 
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The differences between countries are reduced due to the crisis but the relative positions 
of the countries have not changed much: the Nordic countries still performing best (see 
also Jochem, 2011) and the Southern and Eastern countries worse in balancing flexibility 
and security. Remarkably, mobility decreased strongly in Spain and Finland but 
remained high in Austria and Sweden. This might be partly associated with the 
institutional features of these countries such as the extended support of job mobility 
programs. Belgium and Poland appeared capable of maintaining the pre-crisis levels of 
transition security. In many countries the transition rate from fixed-term into open-
ended contracts is rather low and further reduced during the crisis because of which 
fixed-term contracts less and less so function as stepping stones to steady jobs and 
therewith reinforce the dualisation of the labour market. 
In a separate analysis we investigated the impact of the labour market institutions on 
labour market transitions. Especially the protection of regular jobs and the gap with the 
protection of temporary jobs exerted a negative effect on job-to-job mobility and the 
transition from a temporary into a regular job (see also Bentolila et al., 2012). 
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5 Conclusions and points for debate: the next stage of 
flexicurity 
The key findings reported in this paper give reasons to reflect on Europe’s next stage of 
flexicurity. In this final section of the paper 6 points for discussion are forwarded. 
First, clearly, as a result of the deep and continuing financial and economic crisis, both 
flexibility and security have decreased and there certainly is a need to step up the 
employment security dimension of flexicurity, especially for flexible and vulnerable 
workforces. There is a renewed need to fight labour market segmentation (Caspar et 
al., 2012). However, there is also a need to better prepare workers on open ended 
contract for future job and labour market changes. Both groups should be able to share 
the same perspective: a sustainable career in good quality jobs without the risk of long 
spells of unemployment and income loss. Training and education are key here and are 
not or insufficiently accessible for certain groups (see Alphametrics, 2009). Realistically 
speaking it might be quite hard to drive back so-called non-standard employment at 
this point in time and turn it back into standard employment. The gradually decreasing 
share of permanent contracts is a world-wide trend that is among others observed by 
the ILO and we cannot be sure that the stepping stone function of temporary work will 
be reinforced in a post crisis and further ageing society.  
One of the explanations for the growth of non-standard work is that it is not merely 
demand-driven, although many companies are aiming at a larger flexible shell of 
workers as their organizational, business and production models and structures are 
changing – the further rise of the network economy. But workers’ preferences, especially 
among younger generations, are also changing. This not only applies to part-time 
employment, which in countries as the Netherlands is a highly preferred and normal 
way of combining work and private life, but also for a proportion of self-employment. 
Especially in service economies contractual diversity will grow and we might already 
have passed the peak era of wage employment. Furthermore, it should also be 
concluded that cross-border, transnational mobility and migration are here to stay – 
and are vital to our societies. 
This implies that sustainability strategies in the labour market might not exclusively rely 
on building security ladders from non-standard to standard employment. Governments 
can step in and provide national/uniform schemes for vital securities without 
differentiating between groups of workers, including training, pension and work & care 
schemes for all. However, broad, inclusive schemes tend to offer rather minimum levels 
of rights and provisions, unless governments and tax payers are willing to put in a 
substantial contribution. In some countries more universal security could possibly be 
achieved by introducing a new type of uniform open-ended contracts (contrat unique) 
which offer more flexibility than current employment contracts but that build gradually 
build up securities at the same time. Alternatively, social partners in countries with 
extensive collective agreements could decide to include, e.g. on the basis of opt-in 
arrangements groups that are currently not or no longer covered. This will also restore 
the support for and participation in these collective schemes (such as pensions) that are 
currently on the decline (on the one hand because growing groups are not included and 
on the hand because the labour force is shrinking); 
Importantly, one should not overlook financial systems for mortgages and loans. As long 
as these systems are exclusively open to people working on open ended employment 
contracts, many groups in the labour market, especially the young, will have a hard 
time financing a house. Currently banks have grown much more risk averse and the 
creditability and eligibility of non-standard workers is not likely to become stronger. 
All in all the idea could be to turn around the idea of an employment contract into a 
‘labour market contract’, on the basis of people’s membership of the working population, 
or civil society, just like we need to redesign unemployment insurance as ‘employment 
insurance’. Employment rights need to be divorced from the individual employment 
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relationship. Basic entitlements should be afforded to all who participate in the paid 
workforce, however marginally (Fredman, 2004). 
Moreover, a universalized flexicurity scheme should not only operate within national 
borders, but also across these borders, to the benefit of migrant workers. All this can 
be part of the next stage of flexicurity. At the same time it should be acknowledged that 
there can be a clear tension between making flexible employment more secure and thus 
costly, on the one hand, and job opportunities for the low-skilled through this kind of 
employment on the other. 
Discussion point 1: how can more sustainable careers be designed and 
developed for all groups in the labour market, while also strengthening the 
adaptive capacities of European companies and institutions? 
Job creation should be strong focus of flexicurity in the next years. Flexicurity can 
certainly cater to more and better jobs, e.g. in the following ways: 
 Existing, sustainable jobs are maintained and saved by temporary measures such 
as short-time working and social security benefits; Workers are facilitated to 
make a timely transition to a new job in demand sectors, once the necessity 
arises, aiming at decent conditions in the new job, where necessary supported 
by temporary income supplementation and retraining (see Borghouts, 2012); 
some of these transitions could be temporary in the sense that workers might 
move to other sectors in their region that are characterized by a different 
business cycle and later on return to their former jobs; 
 Employers, private and public, are incentivized and supported with the right 
conditions (active support, but also forms of no-risk insurance) in creating new 
jobs and hiring workers; this requires flexible and reliable contracts and e.g. the 
use of temporary wage subsidies to compensate for productivity deficits workers 
might have at the start of the job. That way, ‘in-work’ securities can be offered, 
instead of passive income support in the form of traditional social security 
benefits; 
 Another strategy consist of job-carving, i.e. splitting up existing jobs into high 
and less demanding tasks, the latter allowing for new opportunities for currently 
unemployed people; Especially small and medium sized enterprises (SME’s) are 
supported to further collaborate and coordinate their HR and employment policies 
– this way several ‘near-job vacancies’ within individual firms can be ‘added up’ 
or combined and develop into full vacancies; in a similar way near-redundancies 
can be prevented from developing into real redundancies by maintaining jobs 
through joint employership among SME’s; the French legal concept of multiple 
employership (groupement d’employeurs) can serve as an inspiring example here 
and so-called employment pools, job pools, flex pools or transition pools are 
active among SME’s in various sectors and Member States; 
 Coordination is stimulated within European regions between business, local 
government and training and education institutes (triple helix approach) as to 
jointly develop both business potential and employment security in the region, 
guaranteeing that key sectors of industry and services can dispose of the right 
amount of workers with the right skills at the right moment – well-organised 
regions can thus offer a ‘job guarantee’: not a guarantee for a particular job with 
a particular employer, but the guarantee of keeping a job in the region; Workers 
are encouraged and aided in maintaining the right skill and qualification levels, 
enabling them to remain productive in their current job and equipping them with 
the skills to take on the new jobs to come; 
 Labour markets are made more transparent and the information on both labour 
demand and labour supply is deepened by adequately revealing the actual 
competences workers and non-workers have to offer and the competences 
required by employers (one single ‘language’ in the labour market); this will allow 
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for better and quicker job matching and will turn unfilled vacancies into real jobs; 
e-Matching, e-Portfolio systems and systems for accreditation of prior learning 
are useful here; 
 Currently young people are either in work, in education or unemployed, but there 
is a need for flexible dual systems where they can work and learn, after 
completing vocational training, rather than stay or become unemployed. This is 
also the main thrust of the European Youth Guarantee idea; 
 People are helped by modern social security and active labour market policy to 
make the transition from inactivity to the regular labour market, erasing existing 
disincentives and offering support through forms of retraining and child-care 
facilities; People are facilitated in setting up sustainable forms of self-
employment and micro entrepreneurship, creating, as advocated above access 
to basic securities (training, disability benefits insurance, pensions) and 
preventing the emergence of working-poor; 
 Labour markets, wage and skills levels and taxes on a labour are managed in an 
overall way so that foreign investors and employers are attracted and will be 
offering new job opportunities or insource work that was off-shored and 
outsourced in the past. The global playing field is changing and models for total 
cost of ownership can lead to new decisions on where to manufacture goods. The 
US is already quite successful in the re-shoring of jobs (“bringing jobs back 
home”). A flexible and high-quality work organization can be an asset from this 
point of view. 
Discussion point 2: how can flexicurity strategies contribute further to job 
creation and job growth? 
In addition, both the Common Principles and the components of flexicurity stress the 
sine qua non role of a supportive and productive social dialogue and highly-developed 
trust-based industrial relations play within the process of making flexicurity system 
work. Social partner organizations, the social dialogue and collective bargaining systems 
are not free from pressure, among other things as a result of declining trade union 
membership rates. This development might induce a loss of regulatory capacity, also in 
the area of policy – which could be small or large, depending on the national situation 
of the Member State. A the same time many new Member States still need to manage 
building up more institutional and social dialogue capacity, even though formal 
structures might be in place. Moreover, as already stressed, the growing flexible 
workforces are not or only partly represented in and covered by the existing collective 
systems for labour market coordination and social security organization. Therefore, 
more carriers for flexicurity might be needed than the traditional social partner 
organizations as they can no longer or not yet carry the full load of labour market 
facilities and reforms to cater to the needs of the total workforce, including self-
employed people. This calls for new alliances between all stakeholders in European 
labour markets. Notably the networks, business networks, i.e. regional networks of 
SME’s but also networks throughout the value chain, including large companies, Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM’s), and suppliers and communities, e.g. communities of 
self-employed people, could contribute to increased regulatory and organizational 
capacity (“economy of scale”) and mutual risk management in the labour market. 
Discussion point 3: Who are the future carriers of flexicurity, which 
coordination mechanisms can play new or additional roles? 
It would be premature to conclude that the crisis has heralded the “end of flexicurity” 
or that its “promise” is broken (Fredman, 2004; Hoffer, 2011), simply due to the fact 
that internal flexicurity, among other thing in the form of short-time working 
arrangements, has been widely applied and sometimes fairly successfully used in 
various Member States, next to external flexicurity strategies. In fact, flexicurity is about 
all productive modalities of flexibility (also flexibility for workers) and security, as 
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outlined in the so-called flexicurity matrix, including well-designed combinations of on 
the one hand working-time flexibility and social security on the other. No. 5 of the 
Common Principles of Flexicurity rightly states that internal and external modalities of 
flexicurity are equally important. The EU’s Agenda for New skills and jobs confirms the 
eclectic nature of flexicurity. Both external and internal flexibility have their merits and 
limits, depending on the state of the labour market and the economy, and should be 
handled with care and in an evidence-based way. 
Discussion point 4: how can countries, sectors and companies design and 
adjust the best “flexicurity mix”, taking into account the dynamics of modern 
labour markets and economies? 
Furthermore, as argued in this paper flexicurity translates differently in the various 
clusters of Member States identified in this paper. Also the challenges vary in these 
clusters. However, research that aims at identifying flexicurity practices does show that 
‘next practices’ can be observed that exactly respond to these challenges. Within the 
format of this paper we could only identify a small number of practices. The Mutual 
Learning activities could be further targeted to specific practices and solutions that 
address major flexicurity issues in (clusters of) countries. This can increase policy-
learning in a focused manner. 
Discussion point 5: What practices can be considered “next practices” of 
flexicurity, taking into account the various challenges that (clusters of) 
Member States are facing? 
Finally, all these considerations might also serve to reflect on the current policy EU 
framework of flexicurity. 
Discussion point 6: Is there a need to adjust or complement the current EU 
policy framework of flexicurity – the Common Principles, the components of 
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